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ARTICLES

IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER
SEC RULES 14a-9 AND 10b-5:
THE IMPACT OF VIRGINIA
BANKSHARES, INC. v. SANDBERG
HARVEY GELB*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Congress has provided expressly for private causes of action for certain
violations of the Securities Act of 19331 (the "'33 Act") and the Securities
and Exchange Act of 19342 (the "'34 Act"). For example, Section 11 of the
'33 Act 3 deals with civil liabilities for false registration statements, and Section 18 of the '34 Act4 deals with liability for misleading statements in certain items fied with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In
addition, courts have recognized implied private causes of action with respect to certain securities law violations even though express statutory language authorizing private actions was lacking. For example, both Section
14(a) of the '34 Act,5 as implemented by SEC Rule 14a-9, 6 and Section
10(b) of the '34 Act,' as implemented by SEC Rule lOb-5,8 have been the
bases of implied private actions.9 Whether to imply a private cause of ac* Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. B.A. 1957, Harvard College;
J.D. 1960, Harvard Law School. The author is grateful to the University of Wyoming College of
Law George Hopper Faculty Research Fund for providing a summer research grant to work on
this Article. The author wishes to thank his colleague Brad Saxton for his insightful and helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this Article. The author also is grateful to student assistants M.
Cole Bormuth, Richard A. Erb, Jr., Eric V. Robinson, Michael G. Stull, and Nancy A. Zerr.
1. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988)).
2. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988)).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1988).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1992).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).

8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
9. See, eg., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (recognizing implied action under

Section 14(a) of the '34 Act); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946)
(recognizing implied action under Section 10(b) of the '34 Act).
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tion under a particular statutory provision has been a subject of considerable controversy among the courts.'0
Even after the basic decision to imply a private cause of action under a
particular statutory section is made, difficult questions as to the elements of
the implied cause of action remain. In Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg" ("Sandberg") the Supreme Court dealt specifically with the elements of an implied private cause of action for misleading proxy statements
under Section 14(a) of the '34 Act as implemented by SEC Rule 14a-9. In
particular, Sandberg addressed questions regarding the actionability of certain proxy statements involving indefinite, unverifiable, and conclusory
terms, and whether misleading proxy statements can legally be considered
the cause of damages to frozen-out and underpaid minority shareholders
who lack the votes to defeat a merger proposal. This Article analyzes and
evaluates the views of the Court in Sandberg, but it goes beyond Section
14(a) to consider the impact of Sandberg on implied private causes of action
under Section 10(b) of the '34 Act as implemented by SEC Rule 1Ob-5. In
addition, it considers the impact of recent legislation and legislative history
on the interpretive perspective of courts with regard to implied private actions under Sections 10(b) and 14(a).
II.

SANDBERG: FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In Sandberg, Virginia Bankshares, Inc. (VBI), a wholly owned subsidiary of First American Bankshares, Inc. (FABI), owned eighty-five percent
of the First American Bank of Virginia (the "Bank") with the remaining
fifteen percent in the hands of about 2000 minority shareholders. FABI
initiated a merger of the Bank into VBI. An investment banking firm was
hired by FABI to give an opinion on the appropriate price for Bank shares
of minority shareholders who would lose their interests because of the
merger. The investment banking firm opined that $42 a share would be a
fair price. The executive committee of the Bank approved the merger at
that price, and full board approval followed. 1 2 In soliciting proxy votes in
favor of the merger proposal, the Bank's directors stated that "they had
approved the plan because of its opportunity for the minority shareholders
to achieve a 'high' value, which they elsewhere described as a 'fair' price,
13
for their stock."'

10. There are also cases that do not recognize implied private actions. See, e.g., Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (rejecting an implied action under Section 17(a) of the
'34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)).

11. 111 S.Ct. 2749 (1991).
12. Id. at 2755-56.
13. Id. at 2756.
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After approval of the merger, Sandberg, a minority shareholder who
had not given the requested proxy, sought damages in federal court from
FABI and the Bank's directors. Sandberg charged that proxies had been
solicited in violation of Section 14(a) of the '34 Act and SEC Rule 14a-9.
She alleged, "among other things, that the directors had not believed that
the price offered was high or that the terms of the merger were fair, but had
recommended the merger only because they believed they had no alternative if they wished to remain on the board." 1 4 Section 14(a) makes unlawful
certain proxy solicitations that contravene SEC rules and regulations. 5
SEC Rule 14a-9(a) provides:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means
of any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other
communication, written or oral, containing any statement which, at
the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is
made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or
which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the
statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct
any statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which
has become false or misleading. 6
The jury was instructed that it could find in favor of Sandberg "without
a showing of her own reliance on the alleged misstatements, so long as they
were material and the proxy solicitation was an 'essential link' in the merger
process."' 7 The jury found for Sandberg based on the violation of Rule
14a-9 by all defendants' 8 and awarded $18 a share, having found that
Sandberg would have received $60 a share rather than $42 per share if there
had been an adequate stock evaluation. 19 The court of appeals reversed the
district court's refusal to certify a class of all minority shareholders in
14. Id. Sandberg also charged breach of fiduciary duties owed to minority shareholders
under state law. Id.
15. Section 14(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or instrumen-

tality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit
or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect
of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this
title.

15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1992).
17. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. at 2756.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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Sandberg's action and ruled that there was liability to all of the Bank's former minority shareholders $18 a share. 20 The court of appeals affirmed the
holding that certain statements in the proxy solicitation were materially
misleading for purposes of Rule 14a-9, "and that respondents could maintain their action even though their votes had not been needed to effectuate
the merger. '2 1 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. In doing
so, the Court addressed "whether causation of damages compensable under
§ 14(a) can be shown by a member of a class of minority shareholders
whose votes are not required by law or corporate bylaw to authorize the
corporate action subject to the proxy solicitation. ' 22 The Court held that
the plaintiffs had failed "to demonstrate the equitable basis required to extend the § 14(a) private action to such shareholders when any indication of
congressional intent to do so is lacking." 3 As will be discussed, Sandberg
did not indicate that such shareholders cannot in any circumstances show a
basis for relief under Section 14(a). Indeed, the decision clearly leaves open
certain possibilities for relief. With respect to another question, "whether a
statement couched in conclusory or qualitative terms purporting to explain
directors' reasons for recommending certain corporate action can be materially misleading within the meaning of Rule 14a-9, ' ' 24 the Court held "that
knowingly false statements of reasons may be actionable even though conclusory in form. "25
III.

ACTIONABILITY OF MISREPRESENTATIONS OF OPINION OR BELIEF
UNDER RULE 14A-9:

THE SUPREME COURT'S VIEW

A key statement found by the court of appeals to have been materially
misleading in violation of Section 14(a) "was that 'The Plan of Merger has
been approved by the Board of Directors because it provides an opportunity
for the Bank's public shareholders to achieve a high value for their
shares.' "26 The defendants argued "that statements of opinion or belief
incorporating indefinite and unverifiable expressions cannot be actionable as
misstatements of material fact within the meaning of Rule 14a-9." 2 7
A number of points should be considered with respect to the Supreme
Court's analysis of that argument. The first point to consider is the mean20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

2756 n.4.
2756.
2755.

2756-57.
2757.
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ing of the jury verdict. The Court interpreted the "jury verdict as finding
that the directors' statements of belief and opinion were made with knowledge that the directors did not hold the beliefs or opinions expressed."2 8
This interpretation enabled the Court to avoid deciding whether scienter
was necessary for liability under Section 14(a). 2 9
The second issue to consider is the materiality of the directors' statements. The Court cited TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,3° which
held that a fact is material "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reason' 31
able shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote."
The Court opined that a statement of belief by corporate directors about a
recommended course of action or an explanation of their reasons for recommending it can be of such importance. 32 The Court reasoned that shareholders know that directors usually have more knowledge and expertise
than the normal investor and that under state law directors are customarily
33
obliged to exercise their judgment in the shareholders' interest.
The third consideration is public policy. Notwithstanding the Court's
assumption that the statements were material, a question remained as to
whether such statements fall within the strictures of Rule 14a-9. 34 The
Court rejected the argument, based on Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores,3 5 that sound policy grounds should place the statements outside of
Rule 14a-9. In Blue Chip, the Supreme Court held that persons suing on an
implied private cause of action for violation of SEC Rule lOb-5 must be
buyers or sellers of securities as opposed to those who rely on deception and
take no action either to sell or to buy.36 The Court explained that allowing
nonsellers or nonbuyers to recover would increase the risk of nuisance litigation resting on a plaintiff's subjective hypothesis about the number of
shares he would have sold or purchased.3 7 In Sandberg, the Court indicated that the Blue Chip decision "deflected the threat of vexatious litigation over 'many rather hazy issues of historical fact the proof of which
depended almost entirely on oral testimony.' "38

28. Id.
29. Id. at 2757 n.5.

30. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
31. Sandberg, 111 S.Ct. at 2757 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,

449 (1976)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
36. Id. at 734.
37. Id. at 734-35.
38. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. at 2758 (quoting Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 743).
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The Court did not see the same dangers in Sandberg from attacks on the
truth of directors' statements of reasons or beliefs. It is important to understand that the Court saw such statements as factual in two senses: "as
statements that the directors do act for the reasons given or hold the belief
stated and as statements about the subject matter of the reason or belief
expressed."'39 The Court did not believe that proof or disproof of such
statements in either sense implicated the concerns expressed in Blue Chip.'
The Court explained that the root of concern in Blue Chip "was a plaintiff's
capacity to manufacture claims of hypothetical action, unconstrained by
independent evidence,"4 1 whereas the Court felt that "[r]easons for directors' recommendations or statements of belief are, in contrast, characteristically matters of corporate record subject to documentation, to be supported
or attacked by evidence of historical fact outside a plaintiff's control."4 2 As
examples of such evidence, the Court pointed to corporate minutes, other
statements of the directors, and circumstantial evidence bearing on the facts
underlying the reasons claimed and the honesty of the statement that such
reasons are the basis for a recommendation or other action, especially
where reasons or beliefs involve money valuations.4 3
The fourth point to consider is the use of conclusory, indefinite, and
unverifiable terms. Although the term "high value," as used in the quoted
statement, is indefinite and in a sense unverifiable, as is the term "fair," the
use of such terms is not immune from liability: "[S]uch conclusory terms in
a commercial context are reasonably understood to rest on a factual basis
that justifies them as accurate, the absence of which renders them misleading."" The Court's position is significant in the protection it provides to
shareholders against the kinds of statements at issue in Sandberg.
The fifth consideration is provable facts about conclusory terms. The
Court pointed to provable facts about assets and levels of operation regarding the issue of whether $42 was "high" and the proposal "fair" when assessed under recognized valuation methods.45 According to the Court,
there was evidence from the plaintiffs bearing upon the $42 price described
in the proxy statement as offering a premium over book value and market
price: (1) a calculation of the book figure based on the appreciation of real

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 2759.
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estate holdings (which eliminated the premium);" (2) evidence that the
market was closed, thin, and dominated by FABI information omitted from
the proxy statement;4 7 and (3) evidence of another fact not disclosed, that
the going concern value of the Bank exceeded $60 per share."a Thus, the
Court held:
However conclusory the directors' statement may have been, then, it
was open to attack by garden-variety evidence, subject neither to a
plaintiff's control nor ready manufacture, and there was no undue
risk of open-ended liability or uncontrollable litigation in allowing
respondents the opportunity for recovery on the allegation that it
was misleading to call $42 "high." 49
Finally, one must consider the dual aspects of misleading statements. In
allowing a cause of action under Section 14(a), the Court identified two
misleading aspects of the statement under consideration: First, the statement misstated the speaker's reasons. 50 Second, it misled "about the stated
subject matter (e.g., the value of the shares)." 5 1 The Court clearly was
against recognizing "liability on mere disbelief or undisclosed motive without any demonstration that the proxy statement was false or misleading
about its subject"5 2 because such recognition would confine Section 14(a)
litigation solely to "the 'impurities' of a director's 'unclean heart.' "I' The
Court believed that if liability rested on such a psychological fact, the temptation to base a Section 14(a) action on psychological inquiry would invite
the strike suits and attrition by discovery that Blue Chip sought to discourage.54 Thus, the Court held that "disbelief or undisclosed motivation,
standing alone, [is] insufficient to satisfy the element of fact that must be
established under § 14(a)."5"
Several other points involving the directors' controversial statements
warrant attention. The first is neutralization. In Sandberg, the defendants
argued that publishing accurate facts in a proxy statement can render a
misleading proposition too unimportant to serve as a ground for liability. 6
The Court agreed, but stated that "not every mixture with the true will

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2760.
Id (quoting Stedman v. Storer, 308 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)).
Id
Id.
Id.
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neutralize the deceptive." '5 7 In the instant case, the Court found the jury
was not compelled to find such a neutralization. 8
The second point is federalism. The Court rejected the argument that
recovery for a misleading statement regarding fairness is tantamount to assuming federal authority to bar corporate transactions thought to be unfair
to a group of shareholders.5 9 The Court noted its statement in Santa Fe
Industries,Inc. v. Green61 that "except where federal law expressly requires
certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law
will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.", 6 ' The Court pointed
out that "[a]lthough a corporate transaction's 'fairness' is not, as such, a
federal concern, a proxy statement's claim of fairness presupposes a factual
integrity that federal law is expressly concerned to preserve. "62
The third point involving the director's controversial statements is "self
accusation." Petitioners complained that the Court was effectively requiring them to accuse themselves of a breach of fiduciary duty. The Court
responded that "liability for misleading others does not raise a duty of selfaccusation; it enforces a duty to refrain from misleading. ' 63 The Court was
careful to point out that it did not decide whether directors were obligated
to state the reasons for supporting the merger."
IV.

THE CAUSATION IssuE-THE SUPREME COURT'S VIEW

Another issue in Sandberg was whether causation of damages may be
shown in an implied private cause of action for misleading proxy statements
under Section 14(a) by a member of a class of minority shareholders whose
votes "are not required by law or corporate bylaw to authorize the transaction giving rise to the claim.",65 The Court reviewed the law by referring to
J.L Case Co. v. Borak,6 6 which held that an implied private cause of action
was available under Section 14(a), and by referring to Mills v. ElectricAutoLite Co., 67 which addressed whether plaintiffs needed to prove that the defect in proxy solicitation had a "decisive effect on the voting."6 8 The Court
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id. at 2761.
Id. at 2758 n.6.
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. at 2758 n.6 (quoting Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479).
Id.
Id. at 2761 n.7.
Id.
Id. at 2761 (footnote omitted).
377 U.S. 426 (1964).
396 U.S. 375 (1970).
Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. at 2762 (quoting Mills, 396 U.S. at 385).
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pointed out that in Mills the merger proposal required a two-thirds vote,
and that the majority stockholders controlled just over half of the shares.
The Court stated:
The Mills Court avoided the evidentiary morass that would have
followed from requiring individualized proof that enough minority
shareholders had relied upon the misstatements to swing the vote.
Instead, it held that causation of damages by a material proxy misstatement could be established by showing that minority proxies
necessary and sufficient to authorize the corporate acts had been
given in accordance with the tenor of the solicitation, and the Court
described such a causal relationship by calling the proxy solicitation
an "essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction." 6 9
The Court recalled that Mills left open the question of whether shareholders whose votes are not required by law or bylaw to authorize the proposed
action could demonstrate causation, 70 a question confronted in Sandberg.
In Sandberg, the minority shareholders offered two theories to deal with
the "essential link" question under the Mills causation test. First, the essential link existed "because VBI and FABI would have been unwilling to proceed with the merger without the approval manifested by the minority
shareholders' proxies, which would not have been obtained without the solicitation's express misstatements and misleading omissions. "71 The Court
further explained:
On this reasoning, the causal connection would depend on a desire
to avoid bad shareholder or public relations, and the essential character of the causal link would stem not from the enforceable terms of
the parties' corporate relationship, but from one party's apprehension of the ill will of the other.7 2
Second, the proxy statement was an essential link because it was the
means to satisfy a state statute requiring minority shareholder approval,
which would save the merger from voidability stemming from a conflict of
interest on the part of a Bank director who had voted for the merger while
serving as one of FABI's directors. 73 The Court explained that the statute
provided that "minority approval after disclosure of the material facts
about the transaction and the director's interest was one of three avenues to
insulate the merger from later attack for conflict."7 4 The causation argu69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. (quoting Mills, 396 U.S. at 385 n.7).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2762-63.
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ment would be based on using the proxy statement to obtain votes to bar a
minority shareholder from proceedings to void the merger."
In analyzing the Court's decisions regarding the theories advanced by
plaintiffs, it is important to consider the perspective of the Court. First,
neither theory presents the solicitation as essential in the Mills causal sense,
where solicitation links the directors' proposal with the votes required to
authorize the transaction. Thus, the Court took the position that either
theory would extend the scope of Borak actions beyond Mills and expand
the class of plaintiffs who could bring suit under Section 14(a). Second, and
of great significance, the Court pointed to the rule that emerged subsequent
to Borak and Mills, "that recognition of any private right of action for violating a federal statute must ultimately rest on congressional intent to provide a private remedy,"7 6 and that "[f]rom this the corollary follows that
the breadth of the right once recognized should not, as a general matter,
grow beyond the scope congressionally intended."7 7 The Court cited
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,78 in which this intent was given primary
consideration in deciding whether to recognize a private remedy in a case
involving Section 17(a) 79 of the '34 Act. In that case, the Court rejected the
implication of such a remedy. 8" Third, the Court could "find no manifestation of intent to recognize a cause of action (or class of plaintiffs) as broad
as respondents' theory of causation would entail."8 1 The Court could find
little in the text or legislative history to help in understanding the intended
scope of the private right of action, and indicated it would have trouble
inferring congressional dependence on implied private actions with respect
to Section 14(a) in light of express actions provided by Congress in other
sections of the statute.82 Fourth, notwithstanding the Court's difficulty
with respect to implying a private cause of action, it expressly refrained
from questioning the Borak and Mills holdings. 83 The Court instead dealt
75. Id. at 2763.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1988).
80. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. at 2764.
81. Id. at 2763.
82. Id. at 2764.
83. Id. at 2764 n.11. The Court said:
The object of our enquiry does not extend further to question the holding of either [Borak]
or [Mills] at this date, any more than we have done so in the past. Our point is simply to
recognize the hurdle facing any litigant who urges us to enlarge the scope of the action
beyond the point reached in Mills.
Id. (citation omitted). It has been argued that the Court's position does leave open the ultimate
possibility of the future elimination by the Court of the implied cause of action under Rule 14a-9.
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with whether the action should be expanded by acceptance of causation
theories as set forth by plaintiffs. In considering that question, the Court
recognized that while congressional silence is a serious obstacle to expanding Borak causation, it is not "a necessarily insurmountable barrier."84
The Court looked to Blue Chip regarding the expansion issue because that
case also involved an effort to expand the scope of an action implied without conclusive congressional guidance. The Court pointed to the Blue Chip
case, stating:
There, we accepted the proposition that where a legal structure of
private statutory rights has developed without clear indications of
congressional intent, the contours of that structure need not be frozen absolutely when the result would be demonstrably inequitable to
a class of would-be plaintiffs with claims comparable to those previously recognized."
Evidently, the Court viewed the Sandberg plaintiffs' quest for a private
remedy, which would place them on the same footing as shareholders with
votes necessary for initial corporate action, as requiring an examination of
policy reasons discussed in Blue Chip. In Blue Chip, plaintiffs who were
neither buyers nor sellers of securities sought the right to sue in an implied
private cause of action under Rule lOb-5, as buyers or sellers of securities
could do.8 6 This view may sound to some extent like an effort to equate
Sandberg and Blue Chip as standing cases. Although analogizing Sandberg
to Blue Chip may be useful and appropriate for some purposes, doctrinal
differences should be borne in mind to avoid confusion. In Sandberg, a
restrictive theory of causation was used to promote policy objectives by limiting the implied action under Rule 14a-9.11 However, in Blue Chip, a restrictive theory of plaintiffs' standingto sue under Rule 10b-5 was employed
by the Court to promote policy objectives. Testimony before a Senate Subcommittee with reference to a proposed statute of limitations for implied
Rule lOb-5 actions by SEC Chairman Richard Breeden points to a variety
of restrictive doctrines:
Courts apply many legal doctrines that are more effective than statutes of limitation in screening out nonmeritorious claims, and which
ensure that investors recover only reasonable damages under the
federal securities laws. For example, courts have long read a pur-

See C. Steven Bradford, The Possible Future of Private Rights of Action for Proxy Fraud: The
ParallelBetween Borak and Wilko, 70 NEB. L. REV. 306, 326 (1991).

84. Sandberg, 111 S.Ct. at 2764.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1992).
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chaser/seller requirement into Rule lOb-5. In addition, in the past
decade, notions of causation have been used to ensure a nexus between alleged misrepresentations and damages sought. Many courts
have held that a plaintiff is not entitled to recovery unless he can
show both that (1) but for the fraud he would not have entered into
the transaction, and (2) the losses sustained by the plaintiff resulted
from the defendant's conduct. Further, a plaintiff in a 10(b) suit
must prove scienter, or degree of knowledge greater than mere
negligence.88
In addition, Chairman Breeden referred to Sandberg as a Supreme Court
holding "that attenuated causation would not support recovery by a plain' '89
tiff for violation of the proxy provisions.
In dealing with the first theory that a desire to avoid minority shareholders' ill will should justify recognizing the requisite causality of a proxy
statement needed to obtain minority support, the Court referred to the policy analysis of Blue Chip.90
Recalling Blue Chip's concern about liability turning "on 'hazy' issues
inviting self-serving testimony, strike suits, and protracted discovery, with
little chance of reasonable resolution by pretrial process,"9 1 the Court found
"[t]he same threats of speculative claims and procedural intractability are
inherent in respondents' theory of causation linked through the directors'
desire for a cosmetic vote." 92 The Court was concerned about dissatisfied
minority shareholders alleging that managerial timidity would have
doomed corporate action but for the approval induced by a misleading
statement, opposing claims of hypothetical diffidence and boldness of direc93
tors, and resulting depositions precluding judicial resolution short of trial.
The Court said:
Reliable evidence would seldom exist. Directors would understand
the prudence of making a few statements about plans to proceed
even without minority endorsement, and discovery would be a quest
for recollections of oral conversations at odds with the official pronouncements, in hopes of finding support for ex post facto guesses
about how much heat the directors would have stood in the absence
88. To Establish a Statute of Limitationsfor Private Rights ofAction Arising from a Violation
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1991: Hearingson S. 1533 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing,and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1991)

(statement of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, SEC).
89.
90.
Stamps
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 17 n.6.
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S.Ct. 2749, 2764 (1991) (quoting Blue Chip
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 742-43 (1975)).
Id. at 2765.
Id.
Id.
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of minority approval. The issues would be hazy, their litigation protracted, and their resolution unreliable. Given a choice, we would
reject any theory
of causation that raised such prospects, and we
94
reject this one.

Finally, the Court addressed whether the causation requirement was
satisfied because of the function of the proxy solicitation to obtain minority
approval that would preclude a minority suit attacking the merger. 95 The
Court saw this theory as based on the policy ground that a federal remedy
should be provided under Section 14(a) when a false or misleading proxy
statement results in a loss under state law of a shareholder plaintiff's state
remedy for enforcing a state right.96 Evidently, counsel for the SEC and
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had suggested
that causation be recognized ... when a minority shareholder has
been induced by a misleading proxy statement to forfeit a state-law
right to an appraisal remedy by voting to approve a transaction...,
or when such a shareholder has been deterred from obtaining an
order enjoining a damaging transaction by a proxy solicitation that
misrepresents the facts on which an injunction could properly have
been issued.9 7
The Court avoided deciding whether Section 14(a) provides a cause of
action for lost state remedies by finding no indication in the law or facts
that such a loss resulted from the proxy solicitation in this case.9 8 One of
the main reasons for the Court's position was that the Virginia statute bars
a shareholder from seeking to avoid a conflict of interest transaction if minority shareholders ratified the transaction after disclosure of the material
facts of the transaction and the conflict. 99 Thus, according to the Court, if
there was inaccurate disclosure of material facts, there was no loss of state
remedy."° Furthermore, the Court noted that it was not claimed that the
statement misled respondents into "a false belief that they had no chance to
upset the merger, until the time for bringing suit had run out."' 0' 1 Moreover, the Court pointed out that no state appraisal remedy was affected
02
because there was no such remedy under Virginia law.1

94. Id.
95. Id.

96. Id.
97. Id. at 2765-66 (citation omitted).
98. Id. at 2766.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2766 n.14.
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V.

ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S POSITION ON THE
ACTIONABILITY OF MISREPRESENTATIONS OF OPINION OR
BELIEF UNDER RULE 14A-9

In considering the Court's position in Sandberg with respect to the actionability under Rule 14a-9' °3 of the directors' statements of opinion or
belief, it may be helpful to differentiate between two separate elements involved in pursuing a cause of action under that rule: materiality and actionability. As indicated above, in Sandberg, the Court's test for materiality of
a fact, as drawn from TSC, " is "if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote." 10 5 How could a statement of the kind made by the directors in
Sandberg be of importance to a reasonable shareholder? As a practical
matter, such a statement may be important in other ways than deciding
how to vote. For example, such a statement may be important in deciding
whether to file suit or publicize the unfairness of the merger in hopes of
preventing the merger. Furthermore, such a statement may be important in
deciding whether to accept the price offered for shares or to seek an appraisal. Indeed, such a statement may be important in deciding whether to
investigate the merits of a merger proposal further, as distinguished from
being lulled into the belief that the merger is advantageous and that further
investigation is undesirable or unnecessary.
Of course, the Sandberg Court's discussion of materiality spoke in terms
of importance in deciding how to vote; the issue of materiality in the context of other decisions was not explicated. The Court's reasons for believing
that the controversial statement could be material have already been discussed, as have the Court's reasons for holding the statements actionable
06
under Rule 14a-9, despite policy arguments like those in Blue Chip.1
To better understand the Court's ruling with regard to the "actionability" of the controversial statement by the directors and not just its "materiality," assume that the same statement was made about high value and fair
price except that the figure offered was $60 per share (which was not only a
fair price, but even a high value). The Court took the position that the
misrepresentation as to directors' reasons for supporting the merger would
not by itself be actionable. The Court did not say that such a misrepresentation would not be material and therefore not actionable. Would such a
103. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1992).
104. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
105. Sandberg, 111 S.Ct. at 2757 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 449); see also supra
notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 32-43.
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statement have been material on the facts of the Sandberg case? When directors tell voters false reasons for their support of a merger, would that be
important to the shareholders who are voting? It may be. The Court explained why directors' views may be important to shareholders by virtue of
the directors' knowledge, expertise, and obligation to exercise their judgment in the shareholders' interest. Furthermore, in Mills, a proxy statement was alleged to be misleading because it told shareholders that their
board of directors recommended approval of a merger without telling them
that all of the directors were nominees of and under the control and domination of the other party to the merger. 0 7 The omission in Mills is not so
different in kind from the misrepresentation as to directors' reasons or beliefs that the Court held in Sandberg would not be actionable without further misinformation. Indeed, in Mills, the Court made clear that it should
not be presumed that shareholders would accept any and every fair merger
offer put before them; thus, the mere fact that the $60 price would be fair
should not put the matter to rest under the Mills approach.10 8 The Court
pointed out in Mills that "in view of the many other factors that might lead
shareholders to prefer their current position to that of owners of a larger,
combined enterprise, it is pure conjecture to assume that the fairness of the
proposal will always be determinative of their vote."' 1 9 Moreover, when
directors lie about their reasons for approving a merger, such a lie could be
material not only in arriving at a voting decision but in arriving at various
other decisions discussed above.
Since the Court does not say that lack of materiality is the basis of its
position, what is the basis? Perhaps the best way to explain the Court's
position in Sandberg is that it represents a strict construction of the scope of
107. In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 n.6 (1970), the Supreme Court
discussed the materiality issue as follows:
In this case, where the misleading aspect of the solicitation involved failure to reveal a
serious conflict of interest on the part of the directors, the Court of Appeals concluded that
the crucial question in determining materiality was "whether the minority shareholders
were sufficiently alerted to the board's relationship to their adversary to be on their guard."
403 F. 2d, at 434. An adequate disclosure of this relationship would have warned the
stockholders to give more careful scrutiny to the terms of the merger than they might to
one recommended by an entirely disinterested board. Thus, the failure to make such a
disclosure was found to be a material defect "as a matter of law," thwarting the informed
decision at which the statute aims, regardless of whether the terms of the merger were such
that a reasonable stockholder would have approved the transaction after more careful
analysis.
Id.
108. Mills, 396 U.S. at 382 n.5.
109. Id. Similarly in the Sandbergmerger context, it is arguable that there may be a factor or
factors that would lead shareholders to prefer the status quo.
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the cause of action under Rule 14a-9 and the use of policy considerations to
determine that scope. The Court's use of policy reasons leads it to Blue
Chip for guidance, and it takes the position that liability based on a psychological fact threatens the strike suits and attrition by discovery which Blue
Chip was trying to prevent. But there is a big difference between the kind of
evidence that concerned the Court in Blue Chip and the kind of evidence
that would be needed to show liability based on the lies of directors about
their motivations. In Blue Chip, the evidence in question involved the
plaintiff's state of mind, a matter about which the plaintiff would be
uniquely able to testify and a matter posing special dangers of manufactured claims and special difficulties of rebuttal. The plaintiffs here, however, would be trying to prove the state of the defendant directors' minds
when they made a representation-a totally different kind of evidentiary
problem. Furthermore, the Court's own words argue against making too
much of the Blue Chip analogy. The Court stated that "[r]easons for directors' recommendations or statements of belief are.., characteristically matters of corporate record subject to documentation to be supported or
attacked by evidence of historical fact outside a plaintiff's control."' 10
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion offered still another possible argument against the position of the Court when he stated that the "disallowance ... of an action for misrepresentation of belief is entirely contrary to
the modem law of torts.""' He nevertheless stated that he had no problem
departing from modem tort law because of his belief that the cause of action under Rule 14a-9 was never enacted by Congress "and hence the more
narrow we make it (within the bounds of rationality) the more faithful we
are to our task.""' 2 While such a negative position about the cause of action under Rule 14(a)-9 at this stage in its life seems extreme, it is most
revealing about the underlying judicial thought process.
The Court's bottom line is troubling. Directors who owe a fiduciary
duty to shareholders and nevertheless lie in a material way about their reasons for approving a merger would not be accountable for such a lie in an
implied action under Rule 14a-9 because the implied action under that rule
has lost favor with the Court. The importance of the directors' misrepresentations and the weakness of the policy reasons offered for restriction of
the implied action, are powerful factors cutting against the Court's narrow
interpretation. It seems inappropriate to take an absolute position that directors may brazenly lie in a proxy statement in a material way about their
110. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2758 (1991).
111. Id. at 2767 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
112. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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reasons for supporting a merger because policy reasons concerning a somewhat questionable or exaggerated fear of charges about director motives
outweigh the need to pursue the directors in an implied cause of action
under a rule designed to protect against proxy statement lies. Still, as indicated above, the Court's position regarding the actionability of the statement in Sandberg contains some good news for plaintiffs in its rejection of
complete immunity for conclusory, indefinite, and unverifiable terms.
In any event, where the Court drew the line of policy was not essential
to the outcome of the Sandberg because the Court's conditions as to the
actionability of the directors' statements were met and the materiality criteria satisfied. Thus, causation became the crucial issue. It should also be
noted that none of the Justices voted against the positions taken by Justice
Souter regarding the actionability or materiality of the directors'
statements.
Furthermore, the Court's strict construction position relative to the implied private action under Rule 14a-9 may be inappropriate in cases affected
by expressions of congressional intent evidenced in 1988 legislation and certain history accompanying it favorable to implied private actions under securities laws. This topic is discussed in Part VII.
VI.

ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S POSITION ON THE

CAUSATION ISSUE

In analyzing the causation position taken by the Court, it is important
to recall Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.113 In that case, the Court held that
the shareholder makes a sufficient showing of a causal relationship between
the violation and the injury if "he proves that the proxy solicitation itself,
rather than the particular defect in the solicitation materials, was an essen'1 14
tial link in the accomplishment of the transaction."
In addition, as indicated above, the Court in Mills specifically left open
the question of "whether causation could be shown where the management
controls a sufficient number of shares to approve the transaction without
any votes from the minority."' 1 5 The Court said, "Even in that situation, if
the management finds it necessary for legal or practical reasons to solicit
proxies from minority shareholders, at least one court has held that the
proxy solicitation might be sufficiently related to the merger to satisfy the
' 16
causation requirement."
113.
114.
115.
116.

396 U.S. 375 (1970).
Id. at 385.
Id. at 385 n.7.
Id.
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Neither Mills nor Sandberg indicates that the essential link test is the
exclusive test to be applied in proxy cases. Since a proxy statement may be
material to shareholders, not only for voting decisions but also for other
decisions, trying to fit all causation problems under an essential link test
may prove inappropriate in the event nonvoting decisions are allowed to be
the basis of implied actions. In Sandberg, the Court found it unnecessary to
decide whether causation could be predicated on misrepresentations material to shareholder decisions to bring suits against mergers or to seek
appraisals.
Before discussing various causation possibilities in Rule 14a-9 implied
action cases, it is convenient to note two general points of criticism of the
Court's position in Sandberg. First, the Court's opinion appears to require
that as a matter of law or corporate bylaw, the solicitation be an essential
link in accomplishing the transaction in order to fit under the essential link
test.' 17 However, drawing the line so that the solicitation is required by law
or bylaw is unclear and may be underinclusive. Did the Court intend to set
up two separate categories of governmentally prescribed law (such as a
statute) and bylaws? Suppose for example, that the solicitation is required
by corporate charter. Would such a solicitation be less of an essential link
than one required by a bylaw? It is doubtful that the Court would take that
position. Indeed it is arguable that a solicitation required by a duly adopted
Board resolution is as essential as one required by a bylaw. Moreover, in
Mills it appears that the essential link came from a merger agreement re18
quirement of a two-thirds vote.'
Second, the position of the Court in Sandberg in discussing the intent of
Congress with regard to the expansion of the cause of action under Rule
14a-9 is unrealistic, if, as the Court seems to say, there really is no indication of congressional intent to even create an implied cause of action under
Section 14(a). It is unrealistic to speak of its growth or limitation in terms
of congressional intent when the Court finds congressional intent so lacking. Since the Court chooses not to overrule precedents establishing a cause
of action under Section 14(a), the issue is more a question of the definition
of the cause of action under that section rather than its expansion or restriction in light of some fictional or imagined congressional intent. When Con117. It should be noted that several Justices believe that the essential link test for causation
may still be satisfied where the minority lacks sufficient votes to defeat a proposal by management.

Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 1I1S. Ct. 2749, 2768, (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 2773 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)."
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in Justice Kennedy's opinion. Justice Marshall
also joined in Justice Stevens's opinion.
118. Mills, 396 U.S. at 379.
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gress has given the courts nothing in the way of intent to go by in terms of
elements of judicially implied causes of action, it is for courts to reasonably
define the causes of action rather than to lament their creation by using
nonexistent congressional intent as a basis for narrowing their scope.
Moreover, as indicated above, the strict construction approach relative
to implied private actions that guided the Court in Sandberg may be inappropriate with regard to cases affected by 1988 legislation and certain accompanying legislative history evidencing congressional intent favorable to
such actions which are discussed in Part VII.
In any event, it is possible that in future cases the Supreme Court will
squarely face issues regarding the materiality and causation of a misrepresentation in a proxy statement impacting on nonvoting decisions that a
shareholder may make, such as a suit decision or an appraisal decision. If
so, as indicated above, the "essential link" language from Mills may be inappropriate in making the causation decision under Rule 14a-9. It is significant that the Sandberg Court did not foreclose the possibility of suits under
Rule 14a-9 based on nonvoting decisions, a matter that will be discussed
hereafter at greater length.
The possible materiality of the directors' statement in Sandberg has already been considered. A differential of $18 per share (as determined by
the jury) may well be important enough to be material in the deliberations
of shareholders with respect to a variety of things that they could dowhether in voting or by suit or other forms of action.
The issue then is what may constitute causation in Sandberg-type cases,
based on material proxy misrepresentations involving implied actions under
Rule 14a-9. The question of causation is considered here in two senses:
legally acceptable causation and factually sufficient causation. As to the
former, the question is what would be within the scope of legally acceptable
causation under Rule 14a-9 when courts make that determination as the
Sandberg Court did? Although a restrictive causation approach based on
an analytical approach like that in Sandberg may be used to limit the opportunities for plaintiffs to use that rule successfully, such an approach may
be inappropriate if the congressional intent evidenced in 1988 legislation
and certain accompanying history favorable to implied actions (discussed in
Part VII of this Article) is deemed to apply to Rule 14a-9 cases. However,
even when courts consider wrongdoing by defendants to furnish legally acceptable causation in a Rule 14a-9 case, issues may arise in determining
whether the wrongdoing is satisfactorily shown to be the factually sufficient
cause (or cause in fact) of the loss suffered by plaintiffs.
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Legally Acceptable Causation

1. Voting Down the Merger.
Because the public shareholders, a minority, could not vote down the
merger in Sandberg, the Court refused to use the essential link theory of
Mills to establish causation. However, in truth, even if the public shareholders were in a majority, they might not succeed in winning a proxy vote
against the merger. The question arises as to the reality of establishing causation or presuming it merely from the fact that public shareholders constitute a majority. Both Mills and Sandberg would allow proof of causation to
flow from the mere fact that public shareholders own a majority of shares, a
position that may often be unrealistic. Still, as a matter of policy, this lack
of realism may be downplayed if lies by directors to shareholders are dealt
with firmly-on the basis that those who have been lied to in a material way
should benefit from a favorable but rebuttable presumption as to causation.
2.

Public Relations.

Suppose that properly informed shareholders could have caused public
relations problems by way of embarrassing or causing ill-will for proponents of the merger to such a large extent that the merger may have been
aborted or defeated even by the majority that proposed it. Of course,
Sandberg rejected the idea that causation could be based on such a theory.
If, however, the Court is willing to give the complaining shareholders the
benefit of a fiction that a theoretical majority would rise to veto a transaction, it seems less daring and perhaps more realistic to allow causation to be
shown by public relations considerations.
In a dissenting opinion joined by three other Justices, Justice Kennedy
was critical of the Court's distinction between cases where minority shareholders could vote down a transaction and cases where causation must be
shown by nonvoting theories." 9 A key point that he makes is that a proxy
disclosure, which suggests that the transaction is unfair to minority shareholders or that the board or majority are in breach of fiduciary duties to the
minority, may lead the majority to vote against management's proposal.' 20
He took the position that "[i]f the majority shareholder votes against the
transaction in order to comply with its state law duties, or out of fear of
liability, or upon concluding that the transaction will injure the reputation
of the business, this ought not to be characterized as nonvoting causal19.

Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. at 2769 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120. Id. at 2770 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

IMPLIED PRIVATE SEC ACTIONS

1993]

tion." 12 1 He even raised the possibility that the majority shareholder may
prefer to avoid the embarrassment of voting against its own proposal and
122
may cancel the shareholders meeting at which the vote was to be taken.
To him, "[tihe real question ought to be whether an injury was shown by
the effect the nondisclosure had on the entire merger process, including the
period before votes are cast."' 12 3 He also challenged the Court's view "that
a nonvoting causation theory would 'turn on "hazy" issues inviting selfserving testimony, strike suits, and protracted discovery, with little chance
of reasonable resolution by pretrial process.' "24 It was his view that the
"likelihood that causation exists supports elimination of any requirement
that the plaintiff prove the material misstatement or omission caused the
transaction to go forward when it otherwise would have been halted or
voted down." '2 5 Recognizing the difficulties of proving or disproving causation as possibly greater when the minority lacks the votes to defeat a proposal, he stated that "[a] presumption will assist courts in managing a
1 26
circumstance in which direct proof is rendered difficult."
3.

Fear of Suit.

If there is proper disclosure, a favorable vote by a minority of shareholders may immunize a transaction against certain kinds of legal attack at
least under the law of some states such as the Virginia law discussed in
Sandberg. Absent minority shareholder approval, could the causation requirement be met by showing that directors would not go ahead with a deal
because the transaction would not be immunized and because of fear of
suit? Although this precise causation argument was not specifically addressed in Sandberg, the Court's ruling would probably be read as cutting
against or even precluding its success.
4. Loss of Ability to Sue Because of Immunity Statute.
It appears that the argument was made in Sandberg that because shareholders would lose the ability to sue under the Virginia statute granting
immunity, recognizing a Rule 14a-9 suit is sufficiently justified. The Court
dealt with that argument by indicating that immunity would not be granted
if disclosure was improper.
121. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
at 2771 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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5. Misrepresentations as to Suit Facts.
The Court did not decide whether misrepresentations material to shareholders in arriving at a decision to bring a suit against a merger could be the
basis of causation for purposes of a suit under Rule 14a-9.' 2 7
6.

Misrepresentations as to Appraisal Facts.

The Court did not decide whether misrepresentations material to a decision on whether to seek an appraisal could be the basis of causation in a suit
28
under Rule 14a-9 because appraisal was not allowed under Virginia law.'
B.

Factually Sufficient Causation

Another question discussed here is when would a misrepresentation that
the Court would recognize, at least in theory, as furnishing a legally acceptable basis for satisfying the causation requirement under Rule 14a-9 also be
a factually sufficient cause (or the cause in fact) of the loss under that rule.
In some situations, dealing with this question may not be simple. Suppose,
for example, the Court took the position that the misrepresentation of facts
material to a suit decision, facts that may be called "sue facts,"12 9 unlike the
misrepresentation of facts involving "ill will," is a legally acceptable basis
for satisfying the causation requirement. That would still leave the possibly
complex question of whether the misrepresentation of sue facts was the factually sufficient cause (or cause in fact) of the loss in a particular case.
One possible position is that the misrepresentation of a sue fact is the
cause in fact of loss only if it is determined that the shareholders would in
fact have sued and that the suit action shareholders would have taken
would have prevented the loss they suffered. By analogy to some Rule lOb5 cases, various standards of causation concerning the possible impact of
suit action may be envisioned. In a previous article, this author discussed
possible causation theories in the context of Rule lOb-5 cases when a shareholder has a means of self-protection in the form of a suit attacking a transaction as follows:
In addition, there is the question of whether it is necessary to show if
the loss would have been avoided by the taking of the self-protective
127. Id. at 2773 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128. Id. at 2766.
129. "A 'sue fact' is, in general, a fact which is material to a sue decision. A 'sue decision' is a
decision by a shareholder whether or not to institute a representative or derivative suit alleging a
state-law cause of action." Sandberg, 111 S.Ct. at 2762 n.9 (quoting Harvey Gelb, Rule Job-5
and Santa Fe-Hereinof Sue Facts, Shame Facts, and Other Matters, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 189, 190
& n.52 (1985) (citation omitted)). "Shame facts" are said to be facts that, had they been disclosed,
would have "shamed" management into abandoning a proposed transaction. Id..
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action. In dealing with this problem a variety of positions have been
taken (in situations where the self-protective method is a suit) as to
what must be shown: 1) the suit would have succeeded; 2) there was
a reasonable probability of success; 3) there was a prima facie case
for relief; 4) a cause of action for relief would have been stated. In
Madison Consultantsthe Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the plaintiff must show by a fair preponderance of the evidence that
he "would have succeeded in preventing the loss he in fact suffered."
The court dismissed the "cause of action" and "prima facie" case
tests as too weak by pointing out that the former would lead to a
finding of causation even in cases where the plaintiff would almost
certainly lose, and that the latter was ambiguous and "would require
a finding of causation even when the defendant could devastatingly
rebut the plaintiff's case."130
In Madison Consultants,13 1 the Court recognized that although its test
may lead to a "trial within a trial," the nature of the claim "depends upon
132
an appraisal of [the plaintiff's] chances of success in a state court suit.
Having a trial within a trial may involve some difficulties. In Kidwell ex rel.
Penfold v. Meikle, 133 the court held "that no relief is available... under
Rule lOb-5 unless a minority member would have succeeded in getting permanent injunctive relief, or damages in excess of an appraisal remedy, in the
state-law action." '3 4 The court explained that "[t]he question is essentially
one of fact, but the federal trial judge should decide any legal issues that
would have arisen in the hypothetical state suit as a matter of law in the
13 5
Rule 10b-5 suit.",
In the previous article, 136 this author also raised questions, however, as
to the propriety of using findings predictive of suit success.
This approach, which insists on findings predictive of suit success,
really ignores a more basic argument that a correct finding in such
cases should involve whether the defendant would have desisted or
retreated from misconduct by virtue of even the threat of a credible
suit or other self-protective action including public exposure which
could be triggered by a disclosure. If so, then the lack of disclosure
would really be the cause of the loss, and a finding as to who would
win the suit would be unnecessary. If the self-protective action is
not a suit by the investor or does not involve any state or federal
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Gelb, supra note 129, at 209 (footnotes omitted).
Madison Consultants v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 710 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 65.
597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1294.

135. Id
136. Gelb, supra note 129.
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remedy, but only public exposure, it would seem that the question of
cause would have to be presented along such lines. If a court is
really prepared to decide if nonsuit protective actions would succeed, logically, the court should be willing to determine if suit protective actions, and not the suits themselves, would be successful.
The Madison Consultants case could have proceeded on that
basis. 137
Of course, if it is determined that the suit protective action would not have
led the defendant to desist or retreat, then a finding as to the potential success of the suit may be required.
The attitude of the Court in Sandberg, however, demonstrates a somewhat restrictive causation approach in a Rule 14a-9 case. Such an attitude
is not wholly unreasonable since certain broad approaches pose their risks
for defendants and for courts involving determinations of a rather nebulous
nature, as the following discussion involving comparable problems in Rule
lOb-5 actions indicates:
Acceptance of a shame fact or broad self-protective approach as
bases for liability in rule lOb-5 actions would thus have the effect of
not only widening the kinds of disclosures which would need to be
made, but also of liberalizing the basis on which the cause of the loss
could be determined in the sue-fact situation. But determinations
regarding the potential success of self-protective actions, it must be
recognized, can lead into a rather nebulous area. Presumably too,
an even thinner basis of causation would be formulated in circuits
which accept standards less demanding than one which would require, as in Madison Consultants,that a plaintiff show by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he would have succeeded in
preventing the loss. 3 8
Whether the Court would be more liberal in defining the cause of action in
a Rule lOb-5 case than it was in Sandberg in a Rule 14a-9 case is considered
in the next section.
It should be emphasized that in reaching its decision about causation in
the Sandberg case, the Court was not holding that causation could not as a
matter of logic or reality be shown based on the public relations issue.
Rather, the Court was deciding as a matter of policy not to allow causation
to be shown based upon such a theory because of its fears concerning expansion of liability under Rule 14a-9 based upon considerations like those
of Blue Chip. Indeed, the Sandberg Court recognized the force of the evidence favorable to the plaintiff regarding causation, but stated:
137. Id. at 210.
138. Id.
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The issue before us, however, is whether to recognize a theory of
causation generally, and our decision against doing so rests on our
apprehension that the ensuing litigation would be exemplified by
cases far less tractable than this. Respondents' burden to justify recognition of causation beyond the scope of Mills must be addressed
not by emphasizing the instant case but by confronting the risk inherent in the cases that could be expected to be characteristic if the
causal theory were adopted.13 9
One more issue may be discussed at this point. If the Court allows a sue
fact misrepresentation to be within the range of legally acceptable causation
under Rule 14a-9, how would it allocate the burden of proof with respect to
causation in the proceeding? Mills reflects an accommodating position with
regard to proof to be furnished by the plaintiff in a Rule 14a-9 case where
the essential link is established. In part at least, this accommodation is justified by the difficulties of proof in voting cases. In view of the potential
complexities in sue fact cases and of the policy favoring honest and accurate
proxy solicitation, would such an accommodation be justified in sue fact
cases? Would it be justified in other kinds of cases under Rule 14a-9? One
might ask the same question with respect to sue fact and other kinds of
cases brought under Rule lOb-5. In Sandberg, Justice Kennedy, in dissent,
was ready to create a presumption with regard to causation in favor of the
plaintiffs. Furthermore, as will be seen in the next section, accommodating
plaintiffs with respect to causation issues has marked the Court's position in
certain cases involving implied actions under Rule lOb-5. The strict view of
Sandberg regarding legally acceptable causation in the implied action under
Rule 14a-9 runs somewhat counter to the accommodating spirit of positions
previously taken.
VII. THE IMPACT OF SANDBERG ON IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION
UNDER RULE 1OB-5

Sandberg has had an impact on implied private actions under SEC rules
other than Rule 14a-9. Subsequent to Sandberg, the Supreme Court vacated a judgment involving an implied private cause of action under Rule
13e-3 of the '34 Act" and remanded the case to the court of appeals for
further consideration in light of Sandberg."'1
A natural question arising from Sandberg is whether the causation theories expressed in that case apply to implied private actions under Rule lOb139. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2765 n.12 (1991). But see id. at
2768 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1992). Rule 13e-3 involves going private transactions.
141. Nationwide Corp. v. Howing Co., 112 S. Ct. 39 (1991).
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5. In Scattergood v. Perelman,4 2 the Third Circuit dealt with that question.
In that case, MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings Inc. (M&F) wholly owned
AGI Acquisition Corporation (AGI), which it merged with Andrews
Group Inc. ("Andrews"). M&F owned fifty-seven percent of Andrews.' 43
Shareholders of Andrews were given debentures in exchange for their
stock."4 The claim was made by certain Andrews shareholders that their
shares were priced too low because of premerger and proxy misrepresentations. 4 5 Claims were made under both Rule 14a-9 and Rule lOb-5. 1 46 The
complaint named as defendants, Andrews and certain of its directors and
officers, M&F and certain of its directors and officers, and the individual
who was sole shareholder and chairman of the board of M&F. 47 Claims
were made that the defendants "conducted a fraudulent campaign of misrepresentations designed to depress the stock's price so as to facilitate a
freeze-out merger at a woefully inadequate price"14' 8 and issued a "proxy
statement containing misrepresentations in connection with the vote on
their freeze-out merger."' 49 The court viewed Sandberg in sweeping terms,
stating that the Supreme Court had held "that, when a majority shareholder of a company pursues a freeze-out merger, the chain of causation
between a pre-merger misrepresentation and the price received under the
merger is broken." 150 It was the court's position that while Sandberg addressed Section 14(a) claims only, its reasoning as indicated by its references to Blue Chip (a Section 10(b) case) applies as well to other
misrepresentations preceding a freeze-out merger and to Section 10(b)
claims in connection therewith. 5 1 It was the court's view that Sandberg
ruled out nonvoting causation theories as a class.' 5 2 The court went on to
say:
The Plaintiffs in this case are in a position very similar to that of the
minority shareholder in Virginia Bankshares. Their argument, as we
understand it, is that despite the fact that M & F had the legal power
to effectuate a freeze-out merger, it would not have been willing to
exercise that power had it not been able to depress the price of An142.
143.
144.
145.

945 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 620-21.
Id. at 621.
Id.

146. Id.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 620.
Id. at 624.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 625.
Id.
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drews stock by its campaign of misrepresentation and its misleading
proxy statement. This argument seems to us indistinguishable from
the argument rejected in Virginia Bankshares, where the plaintiffs
argued that, but for the misrepresentations, the majority share1 53
holder would not have been willing to effectuate the merger.
The court recognized a possible exception to the rule about freeze-out mergers that "relates to situations in which the majority's misstatement or omission has caused the minority shareholders to forego an opportunity under
state law to enjoin a merger,"' 5 4 but the "exception, if it exists, is inapplicable here because the plaintiffs did attempt to enjoin the merger under state
law."' 55
Is the court correct that the argument in Scattergood is indistinguishable
from Sandberg? Not really. There is an important factual difference between Scattergood and Sandberg. The claim in Scattergood involved an alleged depression in the price of stock brought about by a campaign of
misrepresentation and the misleading proxy statement. This kind of price
manipulation presents a different kind of case than Sandberg, which involved questions of whether public relations considerations or ill will would
have aborted a merger effort by those in control. To say that Scattergoodis
obviously controlled by Sandberg is quite a stretch.
Furthermore, one cannot read Sandberg and agree with the Third Circuit opinion in Scattergood that the only possible exception to Sandberg's
narrow rule involves shareholders foregoing an opportunity under state law
to enjoin a merger. For example, the loss of an opportunity to seek an
appraisal with respect to shares was not ruled out by Sandberg as a possible
basis for causation, and the Court's opinion did not address all other
possibilities.
Moreover, recent legislation and legislative history may render inappropriate a Sandberg-type strict interpretation based on a narrow view of the
scope of a Rule 14a-9 action or a Rule lOb-5 action, which results from the
principle that implied causes of action should be looked upon with disfavor.
The recent additions of Sections 20A156 and 27A157 to the '34 Act make it
difficult to accept the proposition that a Rule 10b-5 private action should be
looked upon with disfavor simply because Congress may not have initially
intended or expressly provided for such an action. The adoption of both of
these new sections represents express congressional approval of Rule lOb-5
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 625-26.
Id. at 626 n.4.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988).
15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa-1 (West Supp. 1992).
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private actions. Insider trading cases under Section 20A even depend to an
extent on law developed in implied cause of action cases under Rule lOb-5.
For example, the meaning of the word "contemporaneous," which is important to the application of Section 20A, is not set forth in that section but is
dependent on case law. Section 20A(a) codifies the right of action for certain insider trading cases as follows:
Any person who violates any provision of this chapter or the rules
or regulations thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in
possession of material, nonpublic information shall be liable in an
action in any court of competent jurisdiction to any person who,
contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of securities that is the
subject of such violation, has purchased (where such violation is
based on a sale of securities) or sold (where such violation
is based
158
on a purchase of securities) securities of the same class.
Legislative history regarding Section 20A states that "[t]he bill does not
define the term 'contemporaneous' which has developed through case
'
law" 159
and cites several cases that involve Rule lOb-5 as examples. 16 0 In
addition, the history quotes approvingly language from former SEC Chairman David Ruder regarding the importance of private rights of action and
points out that codification of an express right of action was intended to
overturn court cases precluding recovery when the defendant's violation is
based upon the misappropriation theory. House Committee Report No.
100-910 states:
Although the courts have recognized an implied private right of
action in insider trading cases, this section would codify an express
right of action against insider traders and tippers for those who
traded the same class of securities "contemporaneously" with and
on the opposite side of the market from the insider trader. The
value of this provision is evident in the testimony of SEC Chairman
Ruder, who stated on July 11, 1988, before the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance, that "private rights of action
have traditionally served as an important supplement to the Commission's enforcement of the federal securities laws."
In particular, the codification of a right of action for contemporaneous traders is specifically intended to overturn court cases which
have precluded recovery for plaintiffs where the defendant's violation is premised upon the misappropriation theory. See e.g., Moss v.
Morgan Stanley, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983). The Committee believes
158. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (1988).
159. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.

6043, 6064 [hereinafter 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.].
160. 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 159, at 6043, 6064 n.22.

19931

IMPLIED PRIVATE SEC ACTIONS

that this result is inconsistent with the remedial purposes of the Exchange Act, and that the misappropriation theory fulfills appropriate regulatory objectives in determining when communicating or
trading while
in possession of material nonpublic information is
161
unlawful.
The Committee Report furnishes support not only for implied private
actions but also for their expansive rather than restrictive development as
follows:
At the full Committee markup, the Committee also accepted an
amendment to delete the paragraph containing an express private
right of action for parties other than contemporaneous traders. The
Committee's intention in this amendment was to avoid creating an
express private cause of action which might have the unintended effect of freezing the law or in any way restricting the potential rights
of action which have been implied by the courts in this area. Rather,
the Committee wanted to given [sic] the courts leeway to develop
162
such private rights of action in an expansive fashion in the future.
In particular the Committee Report referred to the flexibility of Section
10(b), Rule lOb-5, and other Exchange Act provisions in dealing with insider trading violations:
Despite the absence of explicit statutory language for private rights
of action outside of the contemporaneous trader plaintiff situation,
the Committee recognized that there clearly are injuries caused by
insider trading to others beyond contemporaneous traders. In the
view of the Committee, Section 10(b), Rule lOb-5, and other relevant provisions of the Exchange Act have sufficient flexibility to recognize and protect any person defrauded, or harmed by a violation
of any provision of this title or the rules or regulations thereunder by
another person's purchasing or selling a security while in the possession of material, nonpublic
information, or communicating such in1 63
formation to others.
Further support for the vitality of implied causes of action under Rule
lOb-5 is found in the notion recognized by the Committee that when a
161. Id. at 6063-64.
162. Id. at 6064. The deleted section reads as follows:
(2) OTHER ACTIONS. Any person (other than a person entitled to recovery solely under
paragraph (1) of this subsection) injured by a violation described in such paragraph in
connection with such person's purchase or sale of securities may bring an action in any
court of competent jurisdiction to seek recovery of any damages caused by such violation,
or for appropriate equitable relief, or both.
H.R. 5133, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). The language of paragraph (1) referred to in the deleted
section is quite similar to that of Section 20A(a) referred to in the text accompanying note 158.
163. 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 159, at 6064-65.
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plaintiff is defrauded by the insider trading of a defendant and suffers actual
damages proximately caused by the defendant's behavior, a damages cap of
profit gained or loss avoided by the defendant, which is applicable under the
contemporaneous trading statute, would not be appropriate. "[R]ather, in
such an implied private cause of action, the plaintiff should be able to re' 64
cover the full extent of those actual damages." 1
Although the focus of Section 20A is on insider trading, its text and the
legislative history referred to above do not pertain solely to implied private
actions involving insider trading. The text of Section 20A(d) expressly encompasses other implied actions: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or condition the right of any person to bring an action to
enforce a requirement of this chapter or the availability of any cause of
action implied from a provision of this chapter." '6 5
In its discussion, the Committee offers further evidence of its support
for implied actions at the same time it refers specifically to a case involving
Anheuser-Busch:
The section on private rights of action explicitly states that nothing
in this section may be construed in any fashion to limit or condition
the right of any person to bring an action to enforce a requirement of
the Exchange Act, or the availability of any cause of action implied
under the Exchange Act. The Committee in fact expressly recognizes the implied right of action under the securities laws for cases
including but not limited to the
situations such as that noted above
166
in the Anheuser-Busch case.
Arguably, Section 20A(d) and the legislative history just quoted constitute
congressional recognition of implied private actions not only under Section
10(b) but also under other sections, including Section 14(a). The Committee reference to Anheuser-Busch, which involved insider trading, is explained as follows:
The most prominent example of the non-contemporaneous
trader suit which came to the attention of the Committee involved a
suit filed by Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc. against Paul Thayer,
a former director of the corporation. See Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc., v. Thayer, et. al., CA3-85-0794-R (N.D. Texas 1986). In
that case, the plaintiff alleged that it was defrauded not as a result of
trading with the defendant, but by having information secretly stolen and by having the subsequent trading on the information concealed. According to the complaint in this case, prior to public
164. Id. at 6065.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(d) (1988).
166.

1988 U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 159, at 6065.
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dissemination, the tipper disclosed to several parties the plans of
Anheuser-Busch to acquire Campbell Taggart, Inc. The alleged
misappropriation of Anheuser-Busch's confidential information
proximately caused a significant increase in the market price of
Campbell Taggart stock before Anheuser-Busch announced its offer.
This forced Anheuser-Busch to raise its tender offer price, and the
company eventually paid approximately $80 million more as a result
of the illegal insider trading. Clearly, in such a case, the plaintiff
corporation was a victim of the defendant's misappropriation. In
the view of the Committee, where the plaintiff can prove that it suffered injury as a result of the defendant's insider trading, the plaintiff
has standing to sue in this circumstance, and the remedial purposes
of the securities laws require recognition of such an action.
In the view of the Committee, it was also important to note that
in situations such as the Anheuser-Busch case and others, the potential harm to the plaintiff from the defendant's insider trading or tipping may be far greater than the profit gained or loss avoided by that

defendant. 167
Arguably, the broad support for implied private actions evidenced by
some of the congressional materials quoted above would eliminate the strict
construction approach taken by the Court not only in Section 10(b) cases,
but also in cases under other sections, including Section 14(a). Moreover,
Congress gave express recognition to implied private actions under Section
10(b) in 1991 when it passed Section 27A of the '34 Act, 168 which relates to
the statute of limitations for certain of such actions. Section 27A did away
with the retroactive impact on certain pending cases of a Supreme Court
decision,1 69 which adopted a short limitations period for implied private
actions under Section 10(b) of the '34 Act. In assessing the impact of Section 27A, it should be noted that its validity has been challenged with
170
mixed results.
Significantly, the recent Supreme Court decision in Musick Peeler &
Garrettv. Employers Ins. of Wausau 7 I specifically recognized that congressional acknowledgement of the Rule lOb-5 action flows from Sections 20A
and 27A. In Musick, the Court held that defendants in an implied private
action under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 have a right under federal law to
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa-1 (West Supp. 1992).
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
See, eg., Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (upholding valid-

ity of Section 27A); In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (finding Section

27A to be invalid).
171. 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
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seek contribution from joint tortfeasors. The Court took the position that
both federal courts and Congress have recognized "judicial authority to
shape, within limits, the lOb-5 cause of action."1'72 The Court pointed to
acceptance by federal courts of "the principal responsibility for the continuing elaboration of the scope of the lOb-5 right and the definition of the
duties it imposes."17' 3 In support of that proposition the Court cited Blue
Chip and Sandberg.
The Court explained the congressional support in Sections 20A and 27A
relative to the lOb-5 action as follows:
The existence of that action, and our cumulative work in its design, have been obvious legislative considerations in the enactment
of two recent federal statutes. The first is the Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 . . ., which added the
insider trading prohibition of § 20A to the 1934 Act. ... Section
20A(d) states that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to
limit or condition.., the availability of any cause of action implied
from a provision of this chapter." The second statute is the recent
congressional enactment respecting limitations periods for lOb-5 actions. Following our resolution two terms ago of a difficult statute
of limitations issue for lOb-5 suits.... Congress intervened by limiting the retroactive effect of our decision, and the caution in its intervention is instructive. In an approach parallel to the one it adopted
for the insider trading statute, Congress did no more than direct the
applicable "limitation period for any private civil action implied
under section 78j(b) of this title [§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act] that was
commenced on or before June 19, 1991 ......
We infer from these references an acknowledgment of the lOb-5
action without any further expression of legislative intent to define
it. ... Indeed, the latter statute .... not only treats the lOb-5 action
as an accepted feature of our securities laws, but avoids entangling
Congress in its17 4formulation. That task, it would appear, Congress
has left to US.
Whether Congress intended implied actions under Section 10(b) or
whether courts were wrong to imply them many years ago should lose considerable, if not all, importance in the interpretation game now that Congress has given express recognition and approval to the judicial
development of private implied actions under Section 10(b). It would seem
that the judicial discussion regarding such actions should therefore move to
a different level. This would be so simply by virtue of Section 20A and its
172. Id. at 2089.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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legislative history, even if Section 27A were considered invalid. In addition,
it is arguable that Section 20A and certain accompanying history furnish
significant support for implied private actions under other securities law
sections. Must Congress do even more to satisfy the Court that it approves
of the Section 10(b) private implied action or private implied actions under
other sections such as Section 14(a)? Is the Court ready to abandon its
narrow perspective regarding the scope of any or all of such actions based
on its questioning of original congressional purpose or earlier judicial precedents? Should the Court be as comfortable in using policy reasons as in the
past to restrict the scope of private implied actions under the securities
laws? Significantly, perhaps, the majority opinion in Musick did not refer
to a narrow perspective growing out of the origins of the Section 10(b)
action.
The recent congressional enactments and legislative history and the decision in Musick do not necessarily mean that the Court must or will discard existing narrow interpretations, such as the Rule lOb-5 interpretation
in Blue Chip, without further congressional action. Other considerations
may support the Blue Chip result, and it may be argued that existing
Supreme Court precedents that give narrow interpretations to implied actions under Section 10(b) should not be overturned because if Congress had
intended such a result, it would have expressly so provided. Indeed, the
Court's position in Musick that Congress intended to leave the development
under Rule 10b-5 to courts may cut in the other direction. But, at a minimum, it should be hard to maintain the narrow interpretation perspective
based on lack of congressional intent after the enactment of Sections 20A
and 27A and the Musick assessment of those sections. The use of strict
causation rules and strict rules regarding the actionability of misrepresentations of opinion or belief as in Sandberg would seem inappropriate in Rule
10b-5 actions to the extent that it is based on such a perspective.
Clearly, the policy approach used in Blue Chip to narrowly interpret the
scope of Rule lOb-5 actions was based, to some extent, on the lack of legislative support underlying the development of Rule lOb-5 implied private
causes of action. The Court stated:
[W]e would by no means be understood as suggesting that we are
able to divine from the language of § 10 (b) the express "intent of
Congress" as to the contours of a private cause of action under Rule
lOb-5. When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal
with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn. Such growth may be quite consistent with the congressional enactment and with the role of the federal judiciary in
interpreting it, . . . but it would be disingenuous to suggest that
either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission
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in 1942 foreordained the present state of the law with respect to
Rule lOb-5. It is therefore proper that we consider, in addition to
the factors already discussed, what may be described as policy considerations when we come to flesh out the portions of the law with
respect to which neither the congressional enactment nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive guidance.17 5
Sections 20A and 27A and the legislative history referred to above afford at least some express legislative approval for the judicial oak and, to a
degree, foster its health and growth, and Musick recognizes this. The adoption of these sections after many years of the utilization and development of
implied private actions under Rule lOb-5 arguably should reduce, if not
eliminate, the emphasis on the fact that there was only a legislative acorn
from which Rule lOb-5 implied private causes of action grew. Thus, the use
of Blue Chip policy reasons to preclude findings of causation in Rule lOb-5
cases may be inappropriate or hard to justify. On the other hand, there may
be bases other than the acorn-oak metaphor to support the use of such policy reasons or other ones in construing congressional intent so as to reduce
the effectiveness of private actions under Rule lOb-5.
In addition, application of the Sandberg causation approach to Rule
lOb-5 implied private actions seems questionable in light of the significant
accommodation shown by the Court with respect to plaintiffs' responsibilities regarding causation issues in earlier Rule lOb-5 cases. In Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States,17 6 the Supreme Court decided that when there was
a failure to disclose material information by persons with a duty to make a
disclosure, positive proof of reliance was not a prerequisite to recovery. The
Court held that "[t]his obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact."17' 7 Furthermore, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,"17 the Court held a presumption of reliance
in favor of the plaintiff in a Rule lOb-5 case based on a fraud-on-the-market
theory to be appropriate, explaining as follows:
Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress' premise that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets
reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any material
misrepresentations. It has been noted that "it is hard to imagine
that there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on market integrity. Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap
game?"... Indeed, nearly every court that has considered the prop175. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
176. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).

177. Id. at 154 (citation omitted).
178.

485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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osition has concluded that where materially misleading statements
have been disseminated into an impersonal, well-developed market
for securities, the reliance of individual plaintiffs on the integrity of
the market price may be presumed. Commentators generally have
applauded the adoption of one variation or another of the fraud-onthe-market theory. An investor who buys or sells stock at the price
set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price.
Because most publicly available information is reflected in market
price, an investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule lOb-5

action. 179
This accommodation by the Court to favor the plaintiff with regard to
the causation issue was also discussed in Basic as follows:
We agree that reliance is an element of a Rule lOb-5 cause of action.... Reliance provides the requisite causal connection between a
defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury ....There is,
however, more than one way to demonstrate the causal connection.
Indeed, we previously have dispensed with a requirement of positive
proof of reliance, where a duty to disclose material information had
been breached, concluding that the necessary nexus between the
plaintiffs' injury and the defendant's wrongful conduct had been established. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States.... Similarly,
we did not require proof that material omissions or misstatements in
a proxy statement decisively affected voting, because the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the defect in the solicitation materials,
served as an essential link in the transaction. See Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co ....1110
While it is true that in a sense Sandberg deviates from the accommodating trend regarding causation, of which Mills (a Rule 14a-9 case) is a part, it
seems to take a bigger leap to move away from that trend in a Rule lOb-5
case-particularly since Basic is a fairly recent case decided after the
Supreme Court purportedly saw the errors of past courts in too readily implying causes of action under federal securities law. Furthermore, when a
plaintiff has shown under Rule lOb-5 or even Rule 14a-9 that a defendant
has lied as to a material fact, the easing of the causation burden does not
seem too troubling.
179. Id at 246-47 (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted).
180. Id. at 243 (citations omitted).
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CONCLUSION

On the question of causation, there was considerable division among the
Justices in Sandberg. Four of the Justices dissented. Furthermore, there
were real differences in the approaches of the Justices concerning whether
an implied cause of action under Rule 14a-9 should be narrowly restricted.
Justice Souter, in the opinion of the Court that was joined by three other
Justices, found congressional silence to be a serious obstacle to the expansion of cognizable Borak causation, though not a necessarily insurmountable barrier. In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, while addressing an
issue other than causation, revealed perhaps an even more restrictive approach when he stated that since the federal cause of action at issue was
never enacted by Congress "the more narrow we make it (within the
bounds of rationality) the more faithful we are to our task." 8 '
On the other hand, the dissenting opinion of Justice Kennedy, joined by
the other three Justices, while recognizing that caution should be exercised
in creating implied private rights of action, said:
Where an implied cause of action is well accepted by our own cases
and has become an established part of the securities laws, however,
we should enforce it as a meaningful remedy unless we are to eliminate it all together. As the Court phrases it, we must consider the
causation question in light of the underlying "policy reasons for deciding where the outer limits of the right should lie." '82
Justice Kennedy was critical of the Court's analysis with regard to the purposes underlying Section 14(a), saying that consideration of the purposes
was done "with the avowed aim to limit the cause of action and with undue
emphasis upon fears of 'speculative claims and procedural intractability.' "183 He characterized the result as "a sort of guerrilla warfare to restrict a well-established implied right of action." ' 4 He warned that if the
Court's analysis "is any guide, Congress and those charged with enforcement of the securities laws stand forewarned that unresolved questions concerning the scope of those causes of action are likely to be answered by the
18 5
Court in favor of defendants."
Since its decision in Sandberg, the Court's membership has changed. It
is hard to say if the present Court will revise its narrow perspective with
181. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S.Ct. 2749, 2767 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). For further reference to Justice Scalia's position, see
supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
182. Id. at 2769 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
183. Id. at 2770 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

1993]

IMPLIED PRIVATE SEC ACTIONS

regard to implied private actions under Rule 14a-9. However, there have
been developments that may preclude a narrow Sandberg-type construction
of implied private rights of action under Rule lOb-5, Rule 14a-9, and other
securities laws. Although it may still be possible to quibble about the impact of, or significance of, congressional support for these implied private
actions, as the Court has recognized in Musick, there is no legislative vacuum with regard to such actions. While the legislative record with regard
to implied causes of action can no longer be called "silent," it is conceivable
that the Court would give little weight to the congressional noises that have
been heard to date. On the other hand, Musick does indicate some judicial
recognition of the significance of the congressional actions. One could envision a judicial position requiring further congressional action with respect
to implied private actions before such cases can shed their unfavored status.
Yet, it is difficult to say that existing congressional approval for implied
private actions should be without relevance to the perspective with which
the Court views the elements of the actions. In light of the views expressed
by the dissenters, three of whom remain on the Court, with regard to the
implied cause of action under Rule 14a-9 in Sandberg, and the majority of
six in Musick (five of whom remain on the Court), one can conceive of a
more generous interpretation of implied causes of action under Rule lOb-5
and other SEC rules, including Rule 14a-9. On the other hand, it is possible
that the Court could change its strict approach toward private actions
under Rule lOb-5 as a result of Sections 20A and 27A and some of the
legislative history discussed above, but be unwilling to go that far with respect to private actions under Rule 14a-9 or other SEC rules without further expressions of congressional intent.
The Supreme Court became dissatisfied with the approaches taken by
past courts in readily implying private causes of action under the federal
securities laws. The result of the Court's dissatisfaction in recent years has
been not only a reluctance to imply new causes of action, but also what has
appeared to be a desire to minimize the harm caused by the recognition of
implied private causes of action-not by overruling them, but by narrowly
construing them. Musick, with its recognition of the impact of Sections
20A and 27A, reflects new possibilities regarding lOb-5 actions, but it is not
yet clear how far the Court will go. If private actions under such Sections
as 10(b) and 14(a) really are important in the enforcement of federal securities laws, then Congress should consider the following steps in order to give
courts clearer directions:
1. Identify sections of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, such as sections 10(b) and 14(a), that can be

400
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enforced with private causes of action beyond those already expressly identified.
2. Set forth the elements of recognized private causes of action to
the extent that is legislatively feasible.
3. State whether private causes of action may still be implied or
whether no more implications should be made.
In developing legislation relative to private actions, Congress should determine which securities violations should be redressable by such actions and
should address the elimination of inappropriate strict judicial construction
based on the lack of sufficiently expressed congressional intent. In addition,
in deciding how much specific legislative guidance relative to the elements
of private causes of action should be enacted, Congress should be mindful
that legislative treatment of securities violations, such as fraud, should be
flexible enough to be effective and allow for appropriate judicial interpretation and development.

